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Summary findings
Several authors claim to provide evidence that  Knack and Azfar find that the relationship between
government corruption is less severe in small than in  corruption and country size disappears when one uses
large countries. Knack and Azfar demonstrate that this  either a new corruption indicator with substantially
relationship is an artifact of sample selection.  increased country coverage or an alternative corruption
Most corruption  indicators provide ratings only for the  indicator that covers all World Bank borrowers without
countries in which multinational investors have the  regard to country size.
greatest interest. These tend to include almost all large  They also show that the relationship between
nations but, among small nations, only those that are  corruption  and trade intensity-a  variable strongly
well governed.  related to population-disappears  when samples less
subject to selection bias are used.
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A growing literature finds that corruption, and the quality of governance more
generally, has important implications for growth of per capita incomes (e.g. Mauro, 1995;
Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999). Motivated in part by the breakup of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, another literature addresses the implications of country
size for growth and efficient provision of public goods (Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2000; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997).
Several recent papers, combining elements from these separate literatures, examine
the impact of country size on the quality of governance (Fisman and Gatti, 2000; Root,
1999; Treisman, 1999). These studies all conclude that larger size tend to have
governments that are more corrupt than governments in smaller nations. We demonstrate
that this relationship is entirely an artifact of sample selection. Most available corruption
indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have
the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small
nations only those that are well-governed. The relationship between corruption and
country size disappears, using either a new corruption indicator with substantially
increased country coverage, or an alternative corruption indicator that covers all World
Bank borrowers without regard to country size.
This finding also applies to the apparently favorable effects of trade openness on
corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000).  We show that the
relationship between  openness and corruption is not robust to the use of the newer
corruption indicators that are less subject to sample selection bias.
12. The Costs and Benefits of Being Small
The post-cold war era has seen a dramatic increase in the number of new nations
and new and increasingly plausible independence movements.  Twenty new nations were
created between 1990 and 1994 (Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), mostly due to
the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the divisions of Ethiopia and
Czechoslovakia.  In Indonesia, Aceh or Irian Jaya may follow East Timor in demanding
autonomy or even independence.  Within Western Europe, popular movements in regions
such as Catalonia, Lombardy and Scotland have demanded more extensive self
governance.  In Africa, civil wars in Congo-Zaire and other nations have the potential for
breaking up nations .
These breakups, coupled with the EU monetary union and the spread of
"globalization," have led to an increased interest in the issue of the optimal size of nation-
states.  A Wall Street Journal feature extolled the economic performance of small nations,
arguing that globalization - with freer trade and increased mobility of labor and capital -
has reduced the costs of being small. 2 A theoretical paper by Alesina and Spolaore
(1998) on "The Number and Size of Nations" was the subject of a full-page article in The
Economist. 3
Arguments for the benefits of small manageable countries date at least to Plato and
Aristotle.  Plato declares with characteristic boldness in "The Laws" that the optimal size
of the state is 5040 citizens, and in fact prescribes population control to keep it at this
' Emerson (2000) describes potential independence movements in Indonesia.  Newhouse (1997) discusses
of European regions ranging from Catalonia, the Rhone-Alps, Lombardy and the Veneto which are
demanding and sometimes obtaining increased autonomy. Rising regionalism and state break-ups in
Europe and elsewhere have even prompted authors as influential as Vaclav Havel to suggest "the end of the
nation state" (Havel 1999, see also Matthews 1997).
2 "An Era for Mice to Roar: From Iceland to Botswana, Small Nations Prosper," February 25, 1999.
3See  "A Wealth  of Nations" (The Economist, April 29 1995).
2precise level. 4 Aristotle (1932) states in "The Politics" that "experience has also shown
that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a populous state to be run by good laws" and
prescribes that a state should be large enough to be self sufficient, but small enough to be
manageable and easily surveyed. Unlike Plato, he refrains from providing a precise
number as the optimal state size. More recently, Jalan suggests (1982: 85-86), that
smaller nations benefit from greater social cohesion and fewer vested interests, making it
easier to adapt policies efficiently to new challenges and opportunities.
Other authors have noted various disadvantages associated with smallness. Some
theories of growth also imply increasing returns to scale in economic activity overall (e.g.
Romer, 1986; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), which may put small nations at a
disadvantage. However, cross-country growth regressions do not find evidence for such
scale effects (e.g. Easterly and Kraay, 2000). Small economies are more vulnerable to
terms of trade shocks, because they are more trade-dependent and because they tend to be
diversified across activities.  Although this vulnerability is not associated with slower
growth on average, it is associated with greater year-to-year volatility in growth rates
(Easterly and Kraay, 2000).
Larger nations may benefit more than smaller states from economies of scale in
infrastructure, including communications, power generation, education, and health
facilities. There are also plausibly substantial economies of scale in establishing political
and administrative structures (Srinivasan, 1986).5 As Aristotle noted, the survivability of
small states in a hostile environment is also problematic (Sardar, 1995; Harden, 1985).
4Plato  (1988). A state of 5040  citizens  implies  a population  closer  to 50,000  by modem  standards  as
women,  slaves  and many  other  adult  permanent  residents  were not included  as citizens.
5 However,  some  functions  are often  delegated  by small  states to supranational  bodies  to exploit  economies
of scale. The Eastem  Caribbean  Central  Bank is one  example.
3In a series of recent papers, Alesina and co-authors have analyzed several issues
relating to the optimal size and number of nations. Public goods provision has
implications for the optimal size of nations, as the benefits of internalizing spillovers
must be balanced against the costs of imposing a common set of policies on
heterogeneous groups (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999; Alesina and Spolaore, 1998).
Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) have formally modeled the relationship between
openness and the equilibrium number and size of nations.  In cross-country tests, they
find that the impact of country size on income growth depends on trade openness.  If
trade levels are sufficiently high, larger size carries lesser growth benefits.  They also
present descriptive historical evidence suggesting that decolonization, the creation of
nation-states, and secessions are influenced by trade openness.
3. Country Size and Corruption: Previous Evidence
Several authors have recently examined the implications of country size for the
quality of governance, and found that smaller nations tend to have less corrupt
governments than larger nations. This relationship is potentially important because there
is strong evidence linking corruption - and the quality of governance more generally -- to
economic performance (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones,
1999). If small size helps in controlling corruption, international support for autonomy or
independence movements in highly-corrupt nations could be grounded not only on
principles of self-determination and concern for human rights, but also on "good
governance" considerations.
Based on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 1998,
Root (1999) -- in a cross-country regression using a sample of 60 countries -- finds that
4higher population is significantly associated with low%'er  ratings (i.e. more corruption),
controlling for several other variables.  Root attributes this pattern to economies of scale
in governance: in large nations rulers can extract significant resources from the country
and pay off the constituencies necessary for them to maintain power.  In small countries,
economies of scale paradoxically imply that the state must be run well to be financially
viable.  While the argument is ingenious, it seems just as plausible to make the simpler
argument that small nations do not have the fiscal resources to afford capable and honest
civil servants, and may therefore suffer from more corruption and incompetence.
Fisman and Gatti (2000) conjecture that in large countries, which may have fewer
government officials per citizen -due to similar economies of scale as Root--citizens may
be tempted to bribe officials to jump the queue.  But if these economies of scale really
existed, the time spent in the queues may not be very long.  Indeed, a recent World
Bank/Commonwealth report (discussed below) argues that time spent in queues may be
longer in small countries precisely because of these economies of scale.
Wei (2000) argues that smaller countries must be more open because fewer goods
are domestically produced in small countries. The market discipline imposed by being an
open economy in turn imposes good governance. Note this argument also appears
paradoxical: the quality of the government is being improved by restricting its choice set.
In fact smallness in size may increase the per-capita rents that can be extracted by
customs officials for precisely the same reasons that small economies are more open.
There are fewer domestically produced goods, increasing the demand for imports, so
corrupt customs officials can demand larger bribes 6.
6Anderson  et al (1999)  find that customs  officials  are among  the more  corrupt  government  agencies  in their
empirical  analysis  of anti-corruption  surveys  from the forner Soviet  republic  of Georgia.
5Treisman (1999) finds the log of population is associated with significantly worse
corruption using Business International's corruption indexes for 1980-83, and TI's
indexes for 1996-1998. He speculates that this result may be attributable to diminishing
returns to scale in combating corruption (as law enforcement agencies become less
effective as they get larger), or to lower exposure to imports (leading to more monopoly
power in product markets).
Other arguments could be made about the impact of country size on corruption
levels.  There may be diseconomies of scale in fighting corruption, if anti-corruption
agencies must remain small to avoid infection by corrupt officers. Elliot Ness's early
attempts to combat Al Capone failed because of such an infection; eventually he had to
rely on a small band of "Untouchables" to snare Capone. Two of the three successful
experiences of anti-corruption reform described by Klitgaard (1988) were in the small
city states of Hong Kong and Singapore. On the other hand, Klitgaard's  later book
"Tropical Gangsters" (1991) described rampant corruption in tiny Equatorial Guinea.
That nation's experience suggests that small size might facilitate corrupt activity, by
making it easier for the government to suppress the media and the opposition. 7
A recent report on challenges facing small states8 suggests additional reasons to
expect corruption to be more severe in small nations.  Inability to take advantage of scale
economies in the public sector can result in inadequate compensation levels for civil
servants, increasing their temptation to solicit or accept bribes.  Queues for public
services could be longer, encouraging citizens to offer bribes - as Fisman and Gatti
7 A recent  article  in the New  York  Times  (Onishi  2000)  states  that there is not a single  newsstand  in  the
capital  of Malabo,  and  that the president  had bought  off every opposition  politician  in the recent election.
8 See  Commonwealth  Secretariat/World  Bank  Joint Task Force on Small  States (2000).  Small  States:
Meeting  Challenges  in the Global  Economy.  Report  of the Joint Task Force  on Small  States. According  to
the report,  the median  public  sector  wage  bill is 31% of GDP in developing  nations  with less  than 1.5
million  people,  compared  to 21% for larger  developing  countries.
6conjectured  for larger  countries. Particularly  for nontradeables,  or where  markets  are
less open  to foreign  trade, there are likely  to be more monopolies  and oligopolies  in
smaller  nations,  with associated  rents that public  officials  may be tempted  to extract. The
regulators  and the regulated  are more likely  to have family  or other  personal  ties in
smaller  nations.
Because  arguments  can be made either  way, the relationship  between  corruption
and country  size is ultimately  an empirical  issue. Depending  on the data set chosen,  it is
easy  to find - as did Root (1999),  Treisman  (1999)  and Fisman and Gatti (2000)  -- a
strong  pattern indicating  that smaller  countries  are less corrupt  than larger ones.
However,  we demonstrate  below  that this relationship  is driven  by the absence  of smaller,
more  corrupt  countries  from the data sets  used. In fact, there appears  to be no such
relationship.
4. New  Evidence  on Country  Size and Corruption
We show in this section  that the econometric  relationship  between country  size and
corruption  identified  in Root (1999),  Treisman  (1999)  and Fisman and Gatti  (2000)  is
entirely  a statistical  artifact  created  by sample  selection  in the availability  of corruption
data. The corruption  data used in these studies  are obtained  from firms  that specialize  in
providing  assessments  of "political  risk" to overseas  investors. Generally,  these risk
assessment  firms  provide  assessments  for only a limited  number  of countries. The
selection  of countries  will obviously  reflect  the interest  of overseas  investors  -- the clients
of the risk assessment  firms. Countries  that constitute  large  markets -- such as Brazil,
India,  Indonesia,  Nigeria,  Russia and  the USA - will be of interest  whether  the country  is
7well-governed or not.  In contrast, among smaller countries only those that are well
governed (or rich) are likely to be of much interest to overseas investors.  Iceland shows
up in many more of the standard data sources on governance than does Equatorial
Guinea.
Clearly, selecting countries in this way can potentially create a spurious
relationship between country size and corruption.  The sample will tend to include all
large nations, whether corrupt or not, but only the less corrupt nations among the smaller
ones.
The most widely-known corruption indicator is Transparency International's (TI)
Corruption Perceptions Index.  This corruption indicator is used by Root (1999),
Treisman (1999, 2000) and Wei (2000). It is constructed by standardizing and equally
weighting values from numerous other indicators, including expert assessments -- such as
the International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) "corruption in government" rating -- and
surveys of investors and citizens.9 Values range from 0 (worst corruption) to 10 (least
corrupt). Countries are rated by TI only if data are available from at least three
underlying sources. For example, if the ICRG is the only source from which TI can find
data on a given country, that country is not included in TI's index.
As interest in corruption has increased in recent years, more data from surveys and
other sources has become available to TI.  Accordingly, the number of countries included
in TI's index rose from 41 in 1995 to 54 in 1996, 52 in 1997, 85 in 1998 and 99 in 1999.
As the number of countries increases, representation of smaller and more corrupt nations
will tend to increase, if larger and less corrupt nations were already well represented in
9 See  Lambsdorff  (1999)  for  detailed  methodology.  For  the 1999  TI index,  17  sets  of ratings  from  10
separate  sources  were used.
8the data.  Table 1 shows the sample sizes, means, and standard deviations of the TI
indexes.
Table 2 shows the simple correlations between country size and the TI corruption
index for each of these years.  The correlation with the log of population is -.64 for 1995.
If this relationship is driven by sample selection, then we would expect that this
correlation would decline as the number of countries with TI ratings rises over time.  This
is exactly the pattern found in Table 2.10 As the TI sample more than doubles to 99
nations in 1999, the correlation with population drops by more than half to -.25.
This relationship weakens even further using either of two newer data sets that are
far more inclusive of smaller nations than are the TI indexes.  Recently, Kaufinann,
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) created a "Graft" index using data from 11 sources
(mostly the same as used by TI), and a methodology which weights more heavily those
indicators that tend to be most highly correlated with the others.  In practice, the
differences in data and methodology matter little, as the Graft index is correlated at .98
with the TI 1999 index. The major difference between the indexes is country coverage,
as Kaufmann et al. provide ratings even where there are only one or two underlying data
sources." 1 The Graft index provides ratings for 155 countries, compared to 99 for the
1999 TI index. Values are standardized, so that a Graft index value of 1.5 indicates that a
nation is 1.5 standard deviations above the mean value for all nations.  The lowest value
is -1.567  (Niger) and the highest is 2.085 (Finland and Sweden).
'1  A similar  pattern  is found  using log of gross  national  product  as an alternative  measure  of country  size.
The correlation  with  the  TI index goes from  -.27 for 1995  to a statistically  significant  and positive  .28 in
1999.  We focus  on log of population  because  it is the standard  size  measure  used in  the relevant  literature.
" Kaufmann  et al. also  provide  "standard  errors"  associated  with  each country  value;  these  standard  errors
increase  with the level of disagreement  among  the underlying  sources,  and decrease  with  the number  of
sources  from which  data are available.
9As Table 2 shows, the relationship between population and corruption weakens
even further using this new index which covers many more countries than TI.  This result
is consistent with the hypothesis that this relationship is dependent on the use of samples
that tend to exclude small, corrupt nations.
Table 2 also shows how the median population in the TI sample declines markedly
with time.  The biggest decline, from 22.5 million to 11.5 million, occurred between 1997
and 1998 - the year in which TI's country coverage expanded the most, from 52 to 85.
Using the Graft index as a benchmark, the composition of the TI samples also appears to
be tilted toward less-corrupt nations. The median Graft rating for the TI 1995 sample
was 0.83, nearly a full standard deviation above the mean of 0 for the full Graft sample.
Nearly three-quarters of the TI 1995 sample have Graft scores above the mean value of 0.
As the sample gradually increased through 1999, the representation of more-corrupt
nations increased.  In 1999, however, the TI sample retained a modest bias toward less-
corrupt nations, relative to the Graft sample.'2
Of course, even country coverage for the Graft sample is influenced in part by
investor interest, and may be subject to some bias in analyzing the relation between
corruption and population.  The median-population nation (with 9.2 rnillion) in the 155-
country Graft sample is larger than the median among all 207 nations (5.3 million) for
which the World Bank had population data in 1998. The 52 nations for which population
data are available, but which are missing data on the Graft index, may also be more
corrupt on average than those for which Graft data are available.
A second new corruption indicator, constructed for internal use by the World Bank,
rates every member country which is an active borrower (in practice, most members that
12 Note the median  value  of the Graft  index is -.24, below  its mean  of 0.
10are not high-income nations).  As part of the Bank's annual "Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment" (CPIA), it rates 20 aspects of policies and governance on a 1-6
scale. One of these items measures "transparency, accountability, and corruption in the
public sector."  Unlike TI and even the Graft index, the sample composition is largely
unrelated to population.  The median country size among the 136 CPIA nations in 1999
was 6.4 million, not much larger than the median of 5.3 million among all nations with
data.  Of the 136 nations covered, 29 (mostly small) nations are not represented in the
Graft sample.  Among the CPIA nations with Graft ratings, the median value is -.40, and
only 22.4% have Graft ratings above the mean of 0 (unsurprisingly, as high-income
nations are not included in the CPIA ratings).
Although the CPIA sample likely overrepresents the more corrupt nations, small
nations are only slightly underrepresented, so the estimated relation between population
and corruption should be little affected by selection bias.  As shown in Table 2, the
correlation of the CPIA corruption rating with population is a very modest and
insignificant -.  11.
By estimating missing Graft index data from CPIA ratings, or vice versa,
corruption ratings for 1999 can be generated for 184 nations. 13 Correlations of (log)
population with these augmented Graft and CPIA indexes are only -.05 and -.04
respectively.
Evidence from multivariate tests confirms evidence from these simple correlations
that the population-corruption relationship is driven by sample selection bias.
Regressions in Table 3 control for other variables shown elsewhere to be associated with
13 Missing  Graft values  are imputed  from the regression  Graft=-1.637  + .436(CPIA).  Missing  CPIA  values
are imputed  from  the regression  CPIA=3.325  + 1.155(Graft).  In each  regression,  N = 107,  t = 10.33,  and
11corruption levels, including per capita income, the Freedom House measure of political
freedoms, and a dummy for former British colonies.  14
As the TI sample increases substantially leading up to 1999, the coefficient on population
declines dramatically (equations 1-5).'5 For the Graft index and the CPIA index
(equations 6-7), the relationship disappears entirely. As shown in the bottom row of
Table 3, standardized coefficients for population in these regressions decline steadily as
the sample increases.
By estimating missing data on the Graft index from CPIA index values (or vice
versa), the sample size in these regressions can be increased to 150. In these tests (not
reported in the table), the effect of population is even weaker: for the augmented Graft
index, the standardized estimate for population drops to -.006, and for the augmented
CPIA index to -.017.  The country size and corruption relationship thus appears to be
entirely due to the use of samples which systematically exclude smaller and more corrupt
nations.  16
R2 = .50. These  augmented  corruption  measures  cover all 184  countries  for which  both  population  and  per
capita income  data are available  for 1998,  with  the sole  exception  of Antigua.
14 Independent  variables  are all lagged  a year behind  the dependent  variable. These control  variables  are
taken  from Treisman  (2000)  and Swamy  et al. (2000),  who find corruption  is less severe  in ex-British
colonies;  that  result also shows  up in Table  3. Political  freedom  ranges  from I (least  free) to 7 (most  free),
and is significant  only in the graft  index  regression  in Table  3-the  one with  the largest  sample,  and  with
the greatest  variation  in freedoms. The coefficient  of variation  in freedoms  in the TI 1995  sample  (N=38)
in Table  3 is only  .29, rising  to .45 in the graft  sample  (N=  129). We avoided  using other  regressors  that
plausibly  are related  to corruption  but which  would  reduce  the sample  size substantially.
5 Although  he does  not take  note of it, Treisman's  (1999)  coefficients  (and standard  errors)  for the log of
population  exhibit  a similar  pattern:  .75 (.19) using  the 1996  TI ratings,  with  only 52 nations  in the
regression,  but .50 (.29)  using  the 1998  ratings,  with  74 countries  in the regression.
16 We do not report estimates  from Heckman  sample  selection  models  in tables, because  an extended  search
failed  to identify  any variables  that strongly  affect  selection  but not corruption. However,  the availability
of the Graft and  (especially)  the CPIA indexes  obviates  the need  for using Heckman  selection  methods  to
generate  corrected  estimates  of the effects  of country  size.
125. Determinants of Inclusion in Corruption Data Sets  -
In this section, we present more direct evidence indicating that country size and
corruption levels are each significant determinants of inclusion in the corruption data
sets. Even for the 1999 TI ratings, which cover 99 countries, the only nations with
populations of less than one million that are included (among more than 30 such
independent nations in the world) are Iceland (274,000) and Luxembourg (426,000). In
contrast, the most populous 8 nations are all included, as are 25 of the largest 30.  Of the
15 most populous nations not included in the 1999 TI index, all have below-average
ratings on the Graft index.
The only two small nations included in the 1999 TI index, Iceland and
Luxembourg, both score far above average on the TI index and on the Graft index.
Deleting these two observations reduces the correlation of (log) population with TI's
1998 and 1999 indexes substantially (Table 2).
Table 4 summarizes how the likelihood of inclusion in the various corruption
indexes is related to size and the quality of governance.  Countries are divided into four
categories, those with: (1) below-median population and below-median Graft ratings
(augmented with estimated values based on CPIA ratings), (2) below-median populations
and above-median corruption ratings, (3) above-median populations and below-median
corruption ratings, and (4) above-median values of both population and corruption.
Of 42 countries in the first category, not a single one was included in the TI indexes
for 1995, 1996, and 1997. Until 1998, the bulk of countries in categories 2 and 3 were
also missing from the TI indexes. Most category 4 nations were included even in 1995
(27 of 40), with coverage rising to about 93% in 1998 and 1999. By contrast, the Graft
13index covers the majority of countries in category 1. It has roughly double the country
coverage of TI 1999 for categories 2 and 3.
The CPIA index actually over-represents countries in category 1 (41 of 42).
However, most large countries with below-median corruption ratings are also represented
(43 of 50).  Countries with above-median corruption ratings are equally likely to be
included whether they are small (29 of 50) or large (23 of 41).
The greater tendency for well governed nations to be included in the TI indexes is
not attributable merely to their higher income levels. Table 5 reports logit regressions in
which the dependent variable is a dummy, indicating whether each country is included in
the relevant corruption data set.  Independent variables include population, per capita
income, and corruption levels, as measured by the Graft index (including values imputed
from CPIA ratings, where Graft data were missing). Because of missing data on per
capita income, about 20 fewer countries are represented in Table 5 than in Table 4.
The coefficient on population is positive and significantly associated with the
likelihood of inclusion in each of the TI indexes and the Graft index, but not for the
CPIA.  These results are all as expected, as TI and Graft are constructed by aggregating
ratings provided by firms assessing risks to overseas investors, while the CPIA covers all
World Bank borrowers whether large or small. The coefficient on per capita income is
positively and significantly (except in the case of TI 1996) associated with inclusion in
the TI and the Graft indexes.'7 Income is negatively and significantly associated with
17 This  pattern  has the potential  to create a downward  bias in estimates  of the relationship  between  income
and corruption.  Well-off  countries  are likely  to be included  in the corruption  data sets,  whether  they are
particularly  well governed  or not; arnong  the poorer  countries,  those  that are well governed  are more  likely
to be included  (controlling  for  population).  As the TI sample  increases  over  time,  the sample  selection
problem  should  diminish,  suggesting  that the ceefficient  on per capita income  should  increase. As samples
expand,  they are also  likely  to include  more  countries  for  which  experts  have relatively  little infornation,
and for which  they might  rely on income  as a rough  signal  of the severity  of corruption.  This  would  also
tend  to increase  the coefficient  on per capita income.  Table  3 provides  no evidence,  however,  that  this
14CPIA coverage, because high-income members of the World Bank tend not to be
borrowers.
Higher corruption ratings (measured by the Graft index, augmented by imputing
values from CPIA ratings where data were missing) are associated with a significantly
greater probability that nations are included in the TI samnple. 18 This result suggests that,
even after taking into account income differences, risk ratings firms and other sources of
corruption data often choose not to devote resources to providing regular assessments of
nations which are not sufficiently well governed to generate interest among clients
(mostly overseas investors and lenders).
Figures 1 and 2 plot the relationship between (log of) population and the Graft
index; with countries represented in the TI 1996 (Figure 1) and 1997 (Figure 2) data sets
marked by black diamonds, and countries without TI data marked by white diamonds.
The figures illustrates the sample selection problem in the TI data very nicely.  Overall,
there appears to be no strong relationship between population and the Graft ratings in the
figures.  However, among those countries for which TI values are available (those
marked by black diamonds), there is a clear and strong positive relationship.  The figures
provide obvious visual evidence that data availability on TI is highly dependent on
population and on corruption levels: only the well-governed countries among small
nations are represented in the TI index, and only the large nations among the poorly-
governed ones are represented.
6. Implications
coefficient  increases  as country  coverage  expands. Standardized  coefficients  on per capita income  for the
six  regressions  in Table  3 respectively  are .75,  .83, .77,  .83,  .77,  and .62.
15A recent study (Sambanis, 2000) concluded that territorial partition was ineffective
in reducing ethnic violence. By demonstrating that the commonly-found relation
between country size and corruption is an artifact of sample selection, the analysis above
indicates that partition or secession would also be ineffective in improving the quality of
governance.
Our findings also have implications for researchers. Until data on the quality of
governance are available for all countries, care must be taken in making inferences
regarding independent variables such as population, per capita income, and the quality of
governance, that influence which countries are included in the governance data sets.
These cautions also hold for analyses of the impact on corruption of variables that
are highly correlated with population, such as decentralization (Fisman and Gatti, 2000;
Treisman, 1999) and trade openness (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman 2000; Wei,
2000). Treisman's (1999) results that decentralization increases corruption may be
influenced by the fact that large countries, which tend to be federal, are included in the
sample whether or not they are corrupt, and small countries--which tend not to be federal-
-are only included in the data if they are well governed. Although he minimizes the
importance of the result, Treisman (1999) in fact finds that the negative relationship
between corruption and federalism is not robust to the inclusion of population in his
regressions.
Fisman and Gatti (2000) obtain the opposite result from Treisman (1999): greater
decentralization, measured as the state and local share of government spending, is
associated with lower corruption, using the ICRG corruption index (a 0 to 6 scale, with
higher ratings indicating less corruption). The ICRG index is available for about 130
18  A similar result is found using the  CPIA index as augmented by values estimated from Graft ratings. The
16countries  over  the period they analyzed,  so may be less subject  to sample  selection  bias
than  the TI and Business  International  (BI) indexes  used by Root (1999),  Treisman
(1999)  and Wei (2000). However,  ICRG  coverage  also turns out  to be positively  related
to country  size and corruption  ratings,  as indicated  in the bottom rows of Tables  4 and 5.
Moreover,  only 57 nations  are included  in the Fisman-Gatti  regressions,  due to limited
availability  of data on state and local spending  from GFS. The median  population  in that
57-nation  sample  for 1994  was 10.0  million,  far above  the 5.4 million  median  among  all
126  countries  for which ICRG  and population  data were available. The mean ICRG
corruption  rating for 1995  for their sample  was 4.1, compared  to only 3.5 in the 126-
nation  sample. The simple  correlation  between  log(population)  and the ICRG corruption
rating in their sample  is -.21, but falls  to -.04 in the larger sample. By omitting  the
decentralization  variable,  the sample  in their corruption  regressions  can be increased  to
108. Controlling  for per capita income  and a democracy  indicator,  population  is
unrelated  to corruption  (t-statistic  = 0.4).
The implication  is not that Fisman  and Gatti should  omit population  from  their
regressions.  The major purpose  of their paper  is to estimate  the impact  of
decentralization  on corruption;  if they  did not control  for population,  their estimate  of the
impact  on corruption  of decentralization  (which  is correlated  with the log of population  at
.30)  will reflect  greater selection  bias than if population  were included. The implication,
rather,  is that the population  coefficient  should  not be given  a substantive  interpretation.
Imports  as a share  of GDP is sometimes  included  as a determinant  of corruption
levels (Ades  and Di Tella, 1999;  Treisman,  2000),  in the belief  that higher imports
signify  more competition  in product  markets,  lowering  rents and thereby  bribe-taking.
augmented CPIA and augmented Graft ratings are correlated at .90.
17Ades and Di Tella instrument for imports/GDP with the log of population and the log of
land area, and find that higher imports are associated with lower corruption, as reflected
in the BI ratings and in ratings from the World Competitiveness Report (WCR).  The
import share of GDP is strongly related to population, with a correlation of -.61 for a
sample of 160 countries in 1997. Because Ades and Di Tella (and Treisman, 2000) do
not control for population, the coefficient on imports/GDP in their tests is likely to reflect
selection bias.  Their 31-nation WCR sample is particularly instructive on how investor
interest drives selection; "Their 31 country WCR sample is particularly instructive on
how investor interest  drives selection; it is composed of 24 OECD members (including
new members Korea and Mexico), 2 small and 2 medium-sized fast-growing East Asian
nations (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand), and the 3 largest non-
Communist developing nations (India, Indonesia and Brazil).
Treisman (2000) also finds imports/GDP is associated with better ratings on the BI
index and the 1996 and 1997 TI indexes. However, the relationship disappears for the
1998 TI index; Treisman does not link this latter result to the larger sample provided by
the 1998 TI index. Adding the import share of GDP to our corruption regressions based
on the Graft and CPIA indexes, we confirm that imports/GDP is unrelated to corruption
in samples less subject to selection bias.  19
Wei's result that "natural openness" leads to better governance also turns out to be
driven by sample selection. "Natural openness" is constructed by taking the predicted
values from a regression of trade intensity on (log) population and several other variables.
Population is easily the most powerful predictor of trade in these regressions.  "Natural
openness" averaged over 1994-96 turns out to be correlated at -.91 with (log) population
19  These  results  are not reported  in tables  but are available  from  the authors  on request.
18for 1995. Wei's corruption regressions using the BI corruption index include 66 or fewer
countries, and those using the TI 1998 index include 82 or fewer countries. It is telling
that Wei finds that "residual openness" -- the part of trade intensity unrelated to country
size -- has no impact on corruption. Using a range of corruption indicators in Table 6, we
find that natural openness is also unrelated to corruption.  We replicated Wei' s
regressions of corruption on natural openness, residual openness, log of per capita
income, and the Freedom House democracy indicator. As shomwn  in Table 6, the
coefficient on natural openness is cut in half-  and becomes only marginally significant --
simply by substituting the TI 1999 index (with 14 additional countries) for TI 1998.
Using the Graft index, and particularly the CPIA index, the relationship weakens further
and is not significant. 20 While trade openness may increase growth rates (Frankel and
Romer, 2000), particularly for small countries (Alesina et al., 2000), there is no
convincing evidence that it reduces corruption.
How should researchers respond to potential problems with sample selection in
studying the determinants of good governance? In the short run, it is preferable other
things equal to choose, among existing data sets, those with greater cross-country
coverage.  By aggregating information from several sources, the TI indexes likely contain
less measurement error than the ICRG index. Because the latter currently covers more
than 140 countries, it may nonetheless produce more accurate estimates in the face of
sample selection problems than the TI index, which currently covers only 99 countries.
However, the Graft index combines the advantages of TI (aggregation) and ICRG
20 We obtain  very  similar  results  using  the Frankel  and  Romer  (2000)  predicted  trade  shares,  also
constructed  from  regressions  of trade  intensity  on population  and  geographic  variables.  Inclusion  in the BI
sample,  as for TI, is significantly  related  to population,  per capita  income,  and  corruption  levels  as
measured  by the Graft index  (augmented  by estimates  from CPIA). Our Table  6 regressions  are  based  on
Wei's Table  5, equation  4. Our  TI 1998  regression  replicates  his result closely,  but not exactly.
19(country coverage), and is preferable to either one.  Unfortunately, the CPIA index is not
yet available to researchers outside the World Bank. 2 '  In the longer run it is important to
systematically collect data on all small states, if social scientists are to more rigorously
test hypotheses concerning the impact of country size on governance and other outcomes.
21 Although country coverage of the CPIA index is independent of country size, it has other potential
disadvantages. Unlike the case with ICRG and other commercial furns that produce many of the ratings
used to construct the TI and Graft indexes, there is no financial incentive for accuracy in constructing the
CPIA ratings.  The CPIA also may contain more measurement error than the TI and Graft indexes, which
aggregate information from numerous sources.
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23Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Corruption Indexes
___________  N  Mean  Std. Dev.
TI 1995  41  5.93  2.55
TI 1996  54  5.35  2.60
TI 1997  52  5.67  2.53
TI 1998  85  4.89  2.40
TI 1999  99  4.60  2.36
Graft index (1999)  155  0  1
CPIA (1999)  136  2.89  0.86
ICRG (1995)  129  3.53  1.28
Table 2: Corruption-Population Simple Correlations
Corruption  Correlations  Median  Median  % of
indicator  population  Graft index  sample
in sarnple  in sample  with Graft
(millions)  > 0
Full sample  Pop. > 1
million
TI 1995  -. 64** (40)  -.64** (40)  31.7  .83  73.2
TI 1996  -.56** (53)  -.56** (53)  27.2  .62  63.0
TI  1997  .57** (52)  -. 56**(51)  22.5  .65  69.2
TI 1998  -.34** (85)  -.26* (83)  11.5  .06  52.9
TI 1999  -.25* (99)  -.17 (97)  10.5  -.14  47.5
Graft index  -.17* (154)  -.08 (142)  9.2  -.24  38.7
CPIA  -.11 (136)  -.09 (112)  6.4  -.40  22.4
Population is lagged one year relative to the  respective corruption indicator. A * (**)
indicates significance at .05 (.01) level for 2-tailed tests.
24Table 3: Corruption Regressions
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Dependent var.  TI 1995  TI 1996  TI 1997  TI 1998  TI 1999  Graft  CPIA
Log (population)  -0.387  -0.493**  -0.358**  -0.313**  -0.234*  -0.033  -0.043
(0.185)  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.088)  (0.081)  (0.029)  (0.038)
Log (per capita  2.464**  2.098**  2.185**  1.856**  1.686**  0.494**  0.344**
income)  (0.388)  (0.183)  (0.240)  (0.187)  (0.190)  (0.053)  (0.089)
Ex-British colony  1.462**  1.168**  1.271  *  *  1.415**  1.324**  0.320**  0.319*
(0.360)  (0.271)  (0.324)  (0.258)  (0.263)  (0.096)  (0.134)
Political  freedoms  -0.115  -0.022  -0.051  -0.010  0.118  0.128**  0.073
(0.132)  (0.098)  (0.129)  (0.088)  (0.085)  (0.026)  (0.039)
Intercept  -15.436  -12.193  -13.414  -10.913  -10.337  -4.753  -0.095
(3.800)  (1.473)  (2.094)  (1.449)  (1.414)  (0.399)  (0.736)
N  38  51  49  78  90  129  119
Adj. Ri  .70  .79  .73  .71  .71  .66  .21
Mean, dep. variable  5.8  5.2  5.6  4.8  4.6  .01  2.9
Standardized coeff.  -.22  -.26  -.22  -.20  -.15  -.06  -.10
on log(population)  I
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  Population, per capita income
and political freedoms are lagged one year relative to the respective corruption indicator.
A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.0 1) level for 2-tailed tests.
25Table 4: Representation in Corruption Samples (in %)
Category  1  2  3  4
No. of countries  42  50  50  41
Corruption sample  Pop: Low  Pop: Low  Pop: High  Pop: High
Graft: Low  Graft: High  Graft: Low  Graft: High
TI 1995  0  14  12  67.5
TI 1996  0  18  26  77.5
TI 1997  0  22  22  73.2
TI 1998  9.5  40  46  92.7
TI 1999  26.2  46  54  92.7
Graft index (1999)  54.8  86  94  100
CPIA (1999)  97.6  58  86  56.1
ICRG (1995)  28.6  68  80  97.5
Cells indicate percentages of countries in each category that are represented in corruption
indexes. The four categories are defined in terms of above-median and below-median
population, and above-median and below-median ratings on the Graft index (augmented
by CPIA ratings).  Population is lagged by one year relative to the respective corruption
indicator.
Table 5: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dummy for corruption data availability
Eq.  Dependent  Intercept  Log  Log  Graft index  N  Pseudo
Variable  Population  Per capita  (augmented)  R2
= dummy for:  income
3.1  TI 1995  -27.90 (8.42)  2.47 (0.61)  2.27 (0.84)  2.41 (0.84)  163  .78
3.2  TI 1996  -10.71 (3.64)  1.92 (0.34)  0.65 (0.42)  2.26 (0.64)  163  .67
3.3  TI 1997  -19.79 (5.51)  2.00 (0.39)  1.66 (0.59)  2.45 (0.78)  163  .74
3.4  TI 1998  -7.56 (2.47)  1.16 (0.21)  0.70 (0.29)  1.62 (0.49)  163  .46
3.5  TI 1999  -8.36 (2.41)  0.99 (0.18)  0.89 (0.28)  0.89 (0.43)  162  .39
3.6  Graft index  -14.35 (4.55)  1.89 (0.38)  1.90 (0.57)  1.09 (0.81)  162  .61
3.7  CPIA  45.30 (11.43)  -0.14 (0.20)  -4.80 (1.24)  0.09 (0.68)  162  .73
3.8  ICRG (1995)  -2.47 (2.23)  0.79 (0.15)  0.29 (0.27)  1.09 (0.41)  163  .29
Cells contain logit coefficients and standard errors.  Population and per capita income are
lagged one year relative to the respective corruption indicator. All coefficients are
significant at .05 for 2-tailed tests except those shown in bold.
26Table 6
Natural Openness and Corruption
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Dependent var.  TI 1995  TI 1996  TI 1997  TI 1998  TI 1999  Graft  CPIA
Natural openness  1.922*  2.312**  1.979**  1.694**  0.821  0.217  0.214
(0.749)  (0.459)  (0.640)  (0.440)  (0.438)  (0.142)  (0.216)
Residual openness  0.081  0.013  0.203  -0.141  0.119  -0.010  -0.215
(0.462)  (0.387)  (0.577)  (0.392)  (0.316)  (0.147)  (0.212)
Log (per capita  2.245**  1.855**  2.015**  1.617**  1.526**  0.467**  0.359**
income)  (0.410)  (0.224)  (0.292)  (0.242)  (0.221)  (0.054)  (0.092)
Political freedoms  -0.121  -0.044  -0.006  -0.035  0.141  0.122**  0.076
(0.185)  (0.107)  (0.194)  (0.117)  (0.102)  (0.025)  (0.042)
Intercept  -22.038  -20.529  -21.032  -16.189  -12.838  -5.405  -1.136
(3.283)  (2.078)  (2.687)  (2.257)  (2.262)  (0.636)  (0.959)
N  38  51  47  78  92  128  109
Adj. P2 .64  .75  .70  .63  .63  .62  .23
Standardized coeff.  .27  .30  .27  .24  .12  .08  .09
on natural openness)
IIeteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Population, per capita income
and political freedoms are lagged one year relative to the respective corruption indicator.
A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) level for 2-tailed tests.
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